Since the end of the wars of Yugoslav secession, and since Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Balkans-Serbia included-have taken a back seat in academic research. Even though media freedoms have been severely stifled following the coming to power of Aleksandar Vučić in 2012, today's Serbian media are still failing to become a topic for scholarly research. In this article, we scrutinize the daily Informer, the unofficial daily of Serbia's strongman, president Vučić, via a discourse analysis of its headlines. As shall be shown, the Informer supports the reign of Aleksandar Vučić by framing him as a hero and martyr, fighting for the 'people', in a highly populist fashion, discursively painting the opposition in a highly negative light, as well as promoting warmongering and the idea that Serbia is surrounded by enemies. This is achieved via discursive deception, bases on assertive rhetoric, filled with exaggerations.
Introduction and political context
Since 2012, Serbia has been governed by Aleksandar Vučić, a notorious warmonger from the wars of the Yugoslav secession, who in 1995 infamously proclaimed that for every Serb killed, a hundred Muslims should be killed (RTS 1995) . After the election win in 2012, Vučić has significantly changed his discourse, especially towards the European Union, to which he tries to present himself as a reformed nationalist and a factor of stability, yet, in the words of Eric Gordy of UCL in an interview for the Serbian Monitor:
Vučić will continue playing the same cards, and try to remain an acceptable option to the West. Internationally, he is still going act as a pro-European politician, while domestically, he will continue behaving the way he has been behaving in the last 30 years-as a young lion of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). (Bjelotomić 2017) Florian Bieber of Graz University has coined the term 'stabilocracy', which entails the fact that 'while Serbia grants stability within the region, the West does not care that the (Serbian) government behaves undemocratically' (Đurović 2017) . Apart from a series of affairs that included serious criminal misconduct, Vučić is described by Gordy as the 'man who controls all the media that publish the most damning articles in which his opponents, researchers, analysts, and journalists are called spies' (Bjelotomić 2017) . The 2016 Freedom House report on press freedom in Serbia was detailed and damning, saying that In 2015, the administration of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and aligned media outlets escalated a drive to portray investigative and critical media organizations as foreign-backed propagandists seeking to damage his government and destabilize the country. Self-censorship was a worsening phenomenon that journalists attributed to concerns about both harassment and economic pressure. Journalists continued to experience threats and physical attacks. A number of outlets, including ones that hosted minority-language programs, closed down during a media privatization program outlined in a package of 2014 reform laws backed by the European Union (EU). Political and investigative programs also continue to close, leaving the public with fewer sources of information. (FreedomHouse 2016) Yet this is not where the problems end. Vučić's rule is characterized not only by the stifling of press freedom and by populist domestic politics and discourse, but also by media control, through which, via a vehement, aggressive, warmongering discourse promulgated by his media outlets, such as the daily Informer, deceptive and counterfactual 'fake news' is produced on a daily basis. Ever since the breakup of Yugoslavia, the media within the region have tended to support the government, leading to polarization both at the intra-and interstate level, as well as conflict (Kolstø 2016) ; the Informer, as will be shown in the analysis below, is part of this tradition and the most prolific daily that engages in deception. This article explores the discourse propounded by the Informer, concentrating primarily on the headlines, which are central to the discursive attacks, through a discourse analytical lens. Due to the gradual decrease in interest in the Balkans following the end of military conflict, neither the Informer-nor the contemporary Serbian media as a whole, for that matter-have figured as points of scholarly interest as yet..
In January 2018, the media watchdog group, Fakenews.rs (created by the Novi Sad School of Journalism within the Debunking Disinformation in Serbia project, together with the media development organization Transitions from Prague), published the results of their own following of the Informer, wherein they claimed that they have found 362 instances of fake news within the Informer's front page headlines in the scope of a single year, that is, almost one per day. In their own words, 'the Informer's headlines during the last year were filled by biased, single-minded or completely untruthful or invented instances' (Fakenews.rs 2018) .
Methodology, theory and corpus

As Galasinski wrote in his seminal The Language of Deception: A Discourse Analytical
Study, 'lies and, more generally, deception are everywhere, in both the public and private spheres of our life' (Galasinski, 2000) . They are found in politics (Gruber 1993; W Peter Robinson 1994; William Peter Robinson 1996) , in everyday life (Cody and McLaughlin 1990; Stebbins 1975) , and, particularly relevant to this case study, in the mass media (Bell 1991; Geis 1982; Weaver 1994) . Besides a few research pieces every now and then, deceptive discourse seldom figures as a research topic, even though deception is a part of both daily life, as well as politics, and ever increasingly so within the so-called 'fake news' media. The very lexeme 'lie' is almost shunned in academic discourse, even though social psychology accepts that lying is an important part of daily life and social interaction. This is why we shall approach the subject from both the theoretical view pertaining to Galasinski's detailed work on deception, and also Van Dijk's research into discursive manipulation. According to Van Dijk, manipulation is 'one of the crucial notions of Critical Discourse Analysis' (van Dijk 2006: 359) . On a more general level, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), as a theoretical and methodological point of departure, is here seen as useful due to its direct interest in text and speech (Fairclough and Wodak 1997; van Dijk 2015; Wodak 2011) . Furthermore, CDA 'primarily studies the way social-power abuse and inequality are enacted, reproduced, legitimated, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context ' (van Dijk 2015: 465) . Having in mind the research conducted on the connection between the media and politics, and with it, power, we see that contemporary politics can be characterized as 'mediated' or 'mediatized' (Livingstone 2009 ), as politics is 'continuously shaped by interactions with mass media' (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 250) . What is more, political power itself is often gained and strengthened via the media, traditional or social (Entman 2007; Shirky 2011) , and numerous researchers have discovered 'political tilts' within the media (Entman 2007: 165) pertaining to a vast array of political issues, from protest, via candidates for congress, to unions (Druckman and Parkin 2005; Entman et al. 2005; Martin 2004; Rojecki 1999) . This is why it is of importance to CDA to tackle such issues, as it both covers the methodological ground in dealing with text and speech (in this case, text), as well as dealing on a more broad level with patterns of power-establishing. In other words, 'the media shapes people's reality, reiterating the implications of the power that the media holds' (Salahshour 2016: 1) .
In this particular research piece, we have narrowed down our analysis to the Informer's headlines, for three particular reasons; first, the headlines are most visible (often quite literally, due to the large fonts used, especially in the case of the Informer) and most easily accessible by the audience, second, most of the Informer's discursive vitriol is indeed found in the headlines, and third, the work of a standardized research article has to be constrained. Thus, the corpus analyzed shall be taken from the Informer's headlines. There is a standing criticism of CDA as tending to 'cherry-pick' corpora or corpus-segments, and consequently potentially misrepresent the corpus (Stubbs 1997: 7) . In our case, however, 'cherry-picking' (at least in a rather broad sense) was in fact necessary, having in mind that we are concentrating on deceptive headlines, fake news, and instances of government support, with particular interest being paid to false claims, i.e. fake news-news about events and instances that have not happened. Thus, instead of a grounded theory approach, we have combed through over four hundreds of headlines in the 2012-2018 time period, choosing those that best represent our topic of interest; 64 of them have figured in the select case-tocase analysis below. The online media repository at Novinarnica.net contains all the front pages of the Informer since 2012, while the informer.rs website archives its news and headlines, where the rest of the corpora derives.
It has been said that 'readers get their first or only impressions from headlines.
Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that headlines may be particularly inaccurate or "hyped"' (Caulfield and Bubela 2004: 53) , which is the case, as will be shown, in almost all instances with the Informer's front page headlines. 'It has been suggested that inaccurate or exaggerated reporting can have an adverse impact on public understanding, creating unwarranted hope or fears, and the development of informed policies' (Caulfield and Bubela 2004: 53) ; as will be shown, the Informer bases its news not only on exaggeration, but on the clear invention of counterfactuals as well. This is somewhat due to the fact that 'news outlets, which compete for audience attention to secure their profits from advertising, try to make their information appear relevant, urgent or unusual. For this purpose they customize news through selectivity or enhancement, generalization or simplification, emotionalism or sensationalism' (Molek-Kozakowska 2013: 173-74). The other cause, witnessed by the strong support for the government that is promulgated via the Informer, goes beyond simply trying to 'make information appear relevant', as the Informer bases its content on clear, direct and unmitigated support for the current Serbian government, primarily for the former Prime Minister-cum-president (in the manner of Vladimir Putin or Recep Tayyip Erdogan and their presence in and control of the press). Sensationalism-a common feature of the Informer-is seen as wrapped up with lowered journalistic standards (Allan 2004) , and is relatively common in the media which promote governmental populist policies and discourses. As
Mudde noted, in the populist media, there is a strong 'focus on negative and sensational elements in the news' (Mudde 2004a: 553) .
Drawing upon Mudde's sentiment above, last but not least the fairly broad category of populism should be mentioned from a theoretical point of view. Often defined as 'vague and blurred' (Jagers and Walgrave 2007) and tackled from a variety of perspectives nowadays, we shall take the understanding of populism-due to the linguistic nature of the analysis-to be 'a Manichaean worldview linked to a characteristic language or discourse' (Hawkins 2010) , that is additionally 'defined by demagogy' (Mudde 2004b: 543) , thus defining it as 'an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt élite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people' (Mudde 2004a: 543) . As will become clear in the subsequent analysis, the Informer covers all of the above: it presents the government as bowing to the will of the 'people', protecting it and campaigning for it, while at the same time fighting the corrupt élite of the opposition, that is radically demonised within the discourse. This is achieved by demagogy-if we are to use the less potent term-that is, in the vocabulary of Galasinski, by discursive deception, becoming in the end what we nowadays call fake news.
Case studies
We have identified several recurring tropes in the Informer's headlines. Based on a sample of over 400 front pages, we have collected and categorized them in the following fashion, reflecting their primary ontological focus: 1) strong support for Russia's and Vladimir Putin's policies, where Russia is characterised as a beneficial factor; 2) vehement discourse against the opposition, in which opposition members are portrayed as criminals;
3) a victimhood discourse centered around Aleksandar Vučić, where he is presented as a 'lone hero' fighting enemies within the state and without; 4) a staunch encomiastic rhetoric, in which praise for the figure of Vučić takes central place; 5) an enemy-centered rhetoric, where the object of denigration is either the EU, the USA, or neighboring countries; 6) warmongering; and 7) addresses to 'Serbian brothers'.
These seven tropes are in many cases combined, as will be shown in the analysis below. How were they written? What messages do they convey? What are the lexical choices used? What are the rhetorical tactics? We shall proceed to a step-by-step presentation and discursive analysis of the seven named tropes.
Support for and from Russia is drawn upon heavily and often. Russia is presented as an ally who supports Serbia and its government, with Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, painted in a very positive light. This raises questions about the social and political context, as it is of some importance to understand that the 'media offensive launched against Serbia by the Russian authorities has been based not only on Belgrade's unclear and ambivalent position on the West-Russia dichotomy, but even more so on the distinctly pro-Putin and anti-Western orientation of almost all the leading print media in Serbia' (Bešlin 2016) As seen in the examples above, the use of capital letters is common, and has in scholarship been dubbed 'sensationalist spelling' (Ross 2006) , often used in sensationalist news (Grimes 1990 ) to stress the alleged information provided; this will be valid for the other tropes of interest below. The lexical choice used, in which Putin 'warns' Serbia, Russia does 'not give up' on Serbia, Putin makes 'fierce claims', serves to prove the Mother Goose relation between Serbia and Russia, which is, mostly in nationalist circles, commonly used.
Russia, primarily its president, Vladimir Putin, are framed as 'protectors' or 'defenders' of Serbia, that is under 'attack', be it from Croats (E3), George Soros (E1), or, for that matter, anybody. The headlines convey a dramatic, warlike atmosphere, in which the strength and importance of Russia is emphasized, including a protectionist view of Russia (E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E7), as well as the friendly connection between Russia and Serbia (E6). The opposition parties and leaders are, for lack of other words, demonized within the Informer. They allegedly take parts in 'scandals' (E9), they want to 'cause fights', to 'radicalize protests' (E10), they 'prepare conflicts' (E16). The lexical choices used within the discourse possess a strong negative connotation ('dangerous', 'war', 'occupation'), and the opposition is accused of being the 'servants of NATO', i.e., in the nationalist Weltanschauung, effectively being against their own state and people. In the eyes of the Serbian state, as well as on the broader level of the general population, NATO is viewed in a highly negative fashion after its 1999 bombing of Serbia (Legault 2000; Papasotiriou 2002; Wedgwood 1999) , and a discursive, assertive and uncorroborated connection is established between the opposition and NATO which serves to demonize further the opposition.
Both the leader of the Dosta je bilo opposition party and the opposition leader Vuk Jeremić are accused of wanting 'war'. From a factual perspective, none of the above has happened, and in order to counter reality, the pseudo-information is given in an assertive, declarative fashion, without proof to back up the 'schocking' claims. This declarative nature of the discourse, according to Fraser, is used when there is an 'expression of belief that the state of the world expressed by the propositional content is true' (Fraser 1996) . Once again the declarative, assertive nature of the rhetoric is a hallmark of the Informer's headlines in general, not related solely to the anti-opposition discourse. According to Galasinski, deceptive communication (as seen in the examples above) is the instilling of false beliefs in the target (Galasinski 2000: 19) ; to be more precise, 'deception is a communicative act that is intended to induce in the addressee a particular belief, by manipulating the truth and falsity of information' (Galasinski 2000: 20) . In other words, deceptive communication is a sort of linguistic manipulation (Puzynina 1992) , which, in this case, serves to depict the opposition in a negative light.
The figure of Aleksandar Vučić is perhaps the one most commonly used as a focus by the Informer, it is also the most positively framed one. A Google-specified search using the (Bieber 2002; Korac 1993) , as well as populist nationalism (Boduszyński 2010) . This is achieved via excessive hyperbolic communication, or, in other words, by discursive exaggeration, which is by many researchers seen as intrinsic to deceptive communication (Galasinski 2000: 23; Metts 1989) . Exaggeration is useful in the case of deception as it 'makes the intended meaning ... clearer and less ambiguous' (Kreuz et al. 1998: 97) The Informer tries to convey a vast array of messages in the headlines above to instill a soterological message in the reader. In E32, he is presented as a pacifist, campaigning against war. In E34, he saves people's lives; what is more, these are the lives of Albanians, in a clever connotative play, having in mind the enmity between Serbia and Albania fostered by the élites. In other words, he is so noble, that he even saves Albanians. He also 'strikes like Putin', as Russia's strongman is seen as a role model of strength and masculinity. Vučić is also very competent in his struggle against the opposition, which he 'destroys'. The Informer claims, dropping to the vernacular completely, that he 'has balls' in an encomiastic rhetorical move, yet quickly goes to the martyrdom trope, claiming that he will 'not be forgiven' for being brave, i.e. that he, yet again, might suffer. His might is uncontested, as the opposition 'panics' in front of him. The rhetoric of praise is all-permeating and paints the picture of Vučić as a highly competent person, a statesmen capable of much and of more to come. The media have long been known to support authoritarian leaders (Bos et al. 2011) , with the case of pro-Vučić encomiast discourse, the rhetoric is directly aimed at supporting him, once again, via the overuse of exaggeration.
Continuing along the seven identified tropes, we arrive to the need for the Enemy, the Other, which has been well studied in the social sciences, especially in relation to nationalism and populism, as 'there would be no political psychology if individuals and groups did not have a need for enemies among other groups' (Volkan 1985: 241) . Edelman wrote about the need to have enemies (Edelman 1983) , as 'he holds that categorization is one way in which power may be maintained and perpetuated. The power seat that seeks to perpetuate itself accomplishes this partly by creating definite categories of "enemy" and "ally"' (Volkan 1985: 224) . Enemies are within the Informer created rather commonly: (Gerő et al. 2017: 15) , and since the alleged enemies do not in actual fact exist, the deceptive fake news format is used to promote their very existence.
Connected to the trope of the all-surrounding Enemy, the Informer also engages in a warmongering discourse, seeing war and conflict both within and outside of the country. The media have already been analyzed as potentially warmongering both on a global level (Blumler 1992; Hart 2017; Kellner 2015) , as well as on a Balkan-center local one (Kurspahić 2003; Panic and Pleho 2004) . The result is seen in the following headlines: (Petrović et al. 2013 ). However, already in 2015, it was clear that his anti-corruption rhetoric fell into the category of unfulfilled promises (Karabeg 2015) , which is why even as late as in 2015 (E65), the battle against corruption was promoted yet again, while in 2017, the Informer wrote (E65) that the 'battle against corruption' should 'begin'. Having in mind that no progress was made in the alleged battle, yet more discursive assertiveness was needed to remind the audience of Vučić's alleged combating of corruption.
Academic writing has shown that the media tend to support Vučić's alleged 'war on crime' (Kisić 2015) , even though no actual progress has ever been made. For that reason, a strong declarative rhetoric needed to be reaffirmed. Many of the headlines have thus spoken about alleged arrests, most of which never happened.
Conclusion
From the standpoint of communication, deception, as seen in the Informer's headlines, serves to provide the recipient with an inaccurate picture (Ng and Bradac 1993 ). Galasinski's definition of deception, however, is somewhat more accurate, as he sees 'deception as a communicative act that is intended to induce in the addressee a particular belief, by manipulating the truth and falsity of information' (Galasinski 2000: 20) . He also dubs deception 'a form of manipulation', that Van Dijk has called one of the most important issues in discourse analysis (van Dijk 2006) . The Informer's discourse attempts to manipulate the reader into believing a vast array of false information, most of it designed to foster faith in the figure of the strongman, with Aleksandar Vučić, engaging a populist, nationalist, encomiast, vitriolic discourse. This rhetoric is in line with Vučić's populist mode of governance, which the Informer copies and promotes. He cares for the people, he fights for them and he battles their alleged enemies.
Governance itself, seen through the paradigmatic lens of discursive governance, 'operates through the constitutive power of discourse' (Korkut et al. 2016: 7) , as it 'refers to implicit mechanisms of governance resting on narratives, leitmotifs, and strategic metaphors in a political language, and the subsequent framing of policies using such language to interpose ideas in order to affect political and social representations within the public sphere in accordance with the wishes of political authorities' (Korkut et al. 2016: 2) . In the case of the Informer, this is attained via the invention of news (i.e. fake news) through manipulation and deception, within an essentially assertive, declarative type of discourse. On a lexical level, choices that 'stand out'-even swear words-such as 'murder', 'killing', 'war' and the like are plentiful. The answer to the age old question 'Cui bono?' is doubtless Aleksandar Vučić, the most powerful political authority in recent Serbian history. Repetitive discursive instances seen in the examples above revolve around assertiveness and hyperbolic rhetoric.
Assertiveness is achieved via simple declaration, strengthened often by hyperbolic discourse and excessive exaggeration.
Though essentially this is a micro-level study, there is an intrinsic 'heuristic value of microstudies in opening up new and broad vistas ' (de Chadarevian 2009: 18) , as they help in the understanding of larger societal and political processes (Rawls 1984: 224) . In this article, we have summed up a piece of the larger whole-the discourse of the Serbian government's main media lapdog, the Informer, as exemplified in its headlines. As an avenue for further research, the plethora of texts produced daily not only by the Informer, but by other pro-government media (both traditional and online) should by all means serve as topics of interest for scholars specializing in linguistics, political science, media studies, and other disciplines.
The bodies of the texts to which the analyzed headlines correspond, according to regular analyses of the Raskrikavanje group (a media watchdog from Serbia, related to the Crime and Corruption Investigative Network, one of the rare investigative journalism societies within Serbia), are attributed to anonymous 'well informed sources' (Vučić 2018) , and present a veritable cornucopia of potential qualitative research.
